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phonies—radio signals from stars, black holes and the like); 
not showing immediate economic benefit (or, perhaps more 
appropriately, not showing benefits predominantly of  an eco-
nomic nature) but nevertheless requiring some ‘space.’
In the past, the interests of  radio astronomy were given due 
attention through formal protection by the International Tele-
communication Union (ITU) of  certain frequency bands, 
where radio astronomers were granted exclusive or priority us-
age. Also, many observatories were located in thinly populat-
ed areas where other usage of  the radio spectrum was not par-
ticularly prominent. Finally, the relatively low number and al-
most exclusively governmental character of  telecommunica-
tions players world-wide was a factor generally conducive to 
allowing radio astronomy, as a scientific activity in the pub-
lic interest, its proper place alongside other uses of  the radio 
spectrum.
Fears are, however, that soon no place on earth will remain 
free from coverage by communication signals; there would 
then be no more geographic ‘safe havens’ for radio astrono-
my. Also, the power of  the satellite transponders involved is 
of  such magnitude that spillover to adjacent frequency bands 
will grow enormously—at a time radio astronomy is increas-
ingly confronted with the need to ‘listen’ on frequencies across 
the entire radio spectrum. Radio astronomers are passivelisten-
ers, not able to determine or change the frequencies of  cosmic 
events taking place elsewhere in the universe, but because of  
the foregoing even allocation of  frequency bands on an exclu-
sive or primary basis might no longer suffice to provide radio
1. Introduction
In everyday life, it is increasingly accepted that the general 
benefits to society provided by mobile communications, large 
as they may be, do not necessarily justify the uninhibited use 
of  mobile phones everywhere at every moment. This is rather 
obvious when prominent safety or security considerations are 
at stake, for instance, whilst aircraft are in the process of  tak-
ing off  or landing, or during police or emergency service op-
erations. But also in concert halls, opera houses and theatres 
around the world the use of  such devices is increasingly be-
ing frowned upon, discouraged or even positively prohibited. 
The interests of  visitors at large in enjoying symphonies and 
operas thus take precedence over the interest of  any particu-
lar visitor in being able to communicate by phone everywhere 
at all times.
A similar balance might now be called for at another level. In 
spite of  severe setbacks, the progressive development of  the 
so-called ‘LEO-systems’ and ‘MEO-systems’ for commercial 
mobile satellite communications is undeniable—and poses a 
direct threat to radio astronomy and scientific exploration of  
outer space around the world. These activities, just like concert 
attendance amount to listening (in this case to celestial sym-
*Published with kind permission of  the OECD Megascience Forum. 
The present author contributed to the discussion on International Ra-
dio Quiet Zones by writing a report upon invitation by the OECD 
Megascience Forum. This report was also used as the basis for the 
current article.
Published in Space Policy (2001) 17: 265-274. Copyright 2001, Elsevier. Used by permission.
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The third option, to be considered in detail here, is the most 
revolutionary one as well as being most interesting from a le-
gal perspective. It concerns the establishment of  ‘international 
radio quiet zones’ (IRQZs)—the designation of  areas on earth 
where satellite-related telecommunication signals are kept at or 
below levels tolerable for radio astronomy observations.
The idea of  a ‘radio quiet zone’ is not as outrageous as it may 
sound (in particular to satellite communication operators). In-
teresting precedents are provided in the case of  the US, where 
already in 1958 a first National Radio Quiet Zone (NRQZ) was 
established to protect research activities at the National Radio 
Astronomy Observatory (NRAO) at Green Bank and the Na-
val Radio Research Laboratory (NRL) at nearby Sugar Grove.3 
This NRQZ comprises a square zone of  some 34,000 km2 in 
the states of  West Virginia and Virginia. In this zone, new ap-
plicants for telecommunications licenses—i.e. prospective op-
erators of  radio transmitters—were henceforth subjected to 
special procedures before the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC). Among others, the House of  Representatives 
of  West Virginia passed a Bill on August 9, 1956 whereby it 
further elaborated some legal consequences of  the establish-
ment of  this NRQZ, largely on West Virginian territory, by the 
federal authorities.
With a few exceptions, such new applicants would have to 
notify the NRAO and NRL in due time of  their intended oper-
ations with radio transmitters, providing them with all relevant 
technical and operational details. These institutions are there-
by given the opportunity to comment on the proposed activ-
ity and the possibilities of  interference with their research ac-
tivities. Acting upon such recommendations, the FCC decides 
whether to grant a particular license, depending both upon the 
efforts of  the applicant to accommodate the wishes of  NRAO 
and/or NRL in terms of  preventing unacceptable interference, 
and upon the reasonableness of  the particular balance struck 
in any individual case between the interests of  radio astronomy 
and those of  economic and commercial activities.
For the purpose of  legal certainty and predictability, and of  
allowing prospective applicants the opportunity to accom-
modate ex ante the relevant obligations imposed, complicat-
ed schemes were developed as to the various allowable power 
densities of  proposed transmitters, depending inter alia upon
3FCC Notice of  Proposed Rule Making of  June 20, 1956, Dock-
et No. 11745, appearing in the Federal Register on June 27, 1956 
(21FR4680); Further Notice of  Proposed Rule Making of  June 5, 
1958, Docket No. 11745, published in the Federal Register on June 
11, 1958 (23FR4103), finally adopted November 19, 1958. See fur-
ther J.L. Dolan, Spectrum Control Procedures for the National Radio Astrono-
my Observatory, 61 Proceedings of  the Institute of  Electrical and Elec-
tronics Engineers (1973), 1,350-1,352, for more details.
astronomers with useful ‘windows’ to ‘listen’. Finally, the mor-
al authority and legal effectiveness of  ITU in balancing the var-
ious interests is increasingly being challenged both in law and 
in practice.
The comparison, in particular, with concert attendance thus 
offers itself  again. When it is possible to effectuate an ap-
proach of  limited but conscious abstention on such a ‘micro-
level’ by a combination of  rules and decency, it should perhaps 
be possible to effectuate it on a ‘macro-level’ as well. The sci-
entific activities of  radio astronomers are of  substantial inter-
est to mankind, and scientific exploration has repeatedly been 
recognized as one of  the major human activities vis-à-vis out-
er space which need and deserve—and to some extent already 
enjoy—protection by law.1 There should continue to be at least 
some ‘space for celestial symphonies’, and it is the aim of  the 
present article to analyse in what way the law could help to 
achieve such a goal.
2. IRQZs: National Precedents in the US
Of  course, radio astronomers have noted the aforementioned 
developments with considerable concern. Thus, for example, 
the OECD Megascience Forum, established a few years ago 
by a number of  governments substantially funding scientific 
research on the universe, is giving particular expression to this 
concern.2 The Megascience Forum has focussed on finding so-
lutions essentially along three lines.
First, development of  innovative technology is pursued, as 
the separation or filtering of  man-made signals from those of  
interest to radio astronomy would obviously assist in preserv-
ing research opportunities for radio astronomers. Second, for-
ward-looking regulatory approaches are being investigated. Ra-
dio astronomy does not need permanent exclusivity, it is un-
derstood: in a number of  cases it would be possible to devise 
means of  sharing certain frequency bands on a temporal basis.
1Cf. e.g. Preamble; Artt. I, III, IX, Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of  States in the Exploration and Use of  Outer Space, in-
cluding the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter Outer Space 
Treaty), London/Moscow/Washington, adopted December 19, 1966, 
opened for signature January 27, 1967, entered into force October 10, 
1967; 6 ILM 386 (1967); 18 UST 2410; TIAS 6347; 610 UNTS 205.
2Reference may especially be had to “Protecting the Future of  Radio 
Astronomy,” Report prepared by the Megascience Forum’s Working 
Group on Radio Astronomy, November 1998, and the annexes there-
to, which provide for an extensive evaluation of  this problem which 
the present article can merely summarize. Some of  the issues raised in 
the present article continue to be extensively discussed in the context 
of  the Megascience Forum and other related fora.
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the observatory to be protected) and the ‘functionalist’ param-
eter (the maximum level of  power which would still be accept-
able at such distance, because of  not causing intolerable inter-
ference). Furthermore, radio astronomy’s interests would not 
necessarily call for reservation of  the whole frequency spec-
trum; neither do they require radio quietness 24 h per day, 7 
days per week. Details, however, would still have to be worked 
out: what periods of  radio quietness at which frequencies 
would have preference over which others?
Second, the relevant legislation in NRQZs Is—for obvi-
ous, largely historical and practical reasons—mostly targeted 
at fixed terrestrial transmitters. Such transmitters are, both for 
their size and for their fixation, relatively easily detected, and 
their activities consequently relatively easily monitored. Fur-
thermore, these transmitters evidently and comprehensively 
fall under the sovereign control of  a single state. The major 
problem for any IRQZ, by contrast, lies in the involvement of  
mobile handsets of  often small size, for a major part moving 
in and out of  any particular area (this, moreover, also across 
international borders), respectively of  satellites moving rapid-
ly many kilometers overhead. Whereas an NRQZ could, for all 
practical purposes, be constituted as a two-dimensional zone 
with a relatively simple monitoring structure, in view of  the 
crucial involvement of  satellite sources any IRQZ would need 
to have a fundamentally three-dimensional character, requiring 
a more complex and extended monitoring regime.
A series of  superimposing virtual domes could be visualized, 
one dome with particular geographical measurements for ev-
ery particular power level acceptable at the distance of  such 
measurements, and each dome with the observatory at its geo-
metrical center. The correlation between the measurements of  
any particular dome and the maximum power level it repre-
sents—in other words at what distance which power level is 
still acceptable from the point of  view of  the observatory at 
issue—is a matter for the various stakeholders (including radio 
astronomers) to determine jointly.
Of  course, the dome is merely a theoretical picture, not tak-
ing into account practical features either of  the area under con-
sideration (mountainous? covered with forests?), or of  techni-
cal differences (what may be an acceptable power level at one 
frequency or for one type of  applications may not be so for 
others), or of  other relevant details. Again, it would be for the 
stakeholders to establish a clear picture of  what is a maximum 
tolerable level of  interference at each particular turn.
Third, the established NRQZs are of  a rather small size any-
how: the West Virginian Bill implementing the Green Bank 
IRQZ refers to prohibited power levels at distances of  up to 
10 miles from the NRAO only. By comparison, in satellite mo-
bile communications much higher power levels are at issue, 
and one would therefore probably require transmitters oper-
ating hundreds or even thousands of  miles from the obser-
distance and frequency. In the West Virginian Bill—official-
ly named “Radio Astronomy Zoning Act”—furthermore, for 
every particular distance up to 10 miles from the NRAO ad-
missible levels of  instantaneous peak field strength were pro-
vided in a quite detailed fashion—for any equipment. In addi-
tion, a mobile surveillance system was built at NRAO to mon-
itor interference for the purpose of  upholding the limits thus 
imposed.
This example has been followed by others in the US, since 
the concept of  the NRQZ was seen to fulfill its purposes sat-
isfactorily at least from the perspective of  the FCC and the ra-
dio astronomy community. In 1997, a Radio Astronomy Coor-
dination Zone was established along the same lines in Puerto 
Rico, covering the whole island as well as a few small neighbor-
ing islands.4 The observatory at Arecibo (on Puerto Rico) had 
previously been protected by a four-mile Protection Zone, but 
this protection was no longer considered sufficient in the light 
of  increasing usage of  radio frequencies and increasing pow-
er levels involved. The Radio Astronomy Coordination Zone 
thus considerably enlarged the relevant area, depending upon 
particulars to either 10 miles or the whole island and its small 
neighbors.
3. From National to IRQZs
The establishment of  these national zones is of  great interest 
as a useful precursor to the possible establishment of  IRQZs. 
Nevertheless, a number of  aspects would require further con-
sideration when moving from the NRQZ precedents to the 
IRQZs to be established.
First, it has to be emphasised that NRQZs provide for radio 
quiet zones, not radio silent zones. No absolute and comprehen-
sive ban on mobile communications is envisaged—rather, ‘in-
terference-or-not’ is the issue, reflected in elaboration and im-
position of  permissible power levels. There are a considerable 
number of  exceptions, moreover: for example, in 1973, there 
were some 1,500 licensed transmitters operating in the Green 
Bank NRQZ, in spite of  its character as a rather rural area. 
Most of  those transmitters concerned police and emergency-
usage-related equipment. Such exceptions are obviously rea-
sonable and even inevitable, and for any IRQZ a similar list of  
exceptions will (have to) apply to such clearly public uses re-
garding safety and security.
Absolute radio silence in an IRQZ would therefore not be 
feasible—nor would it be necessary. The essential feature of  
an IRQZ would be the link between the ‘spatialist’ parame-
ter (the measurements in kilometers or miles of  distance from
4FCC Notice of  Proposed Rule Making, ET Docket No. 96-2, 11 
FCC Rcd 1716 (1996); adopted as RM-8165, September 26, 1997, 
FCC 97–347.
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4. The International Legal Parameters for IRQZs
The geographical area required for an IRQZ—as the most 
outward dome deemed necessary—would easily measure some 
thousands of  kilometers, in three dimensions, if  it is to achieve 
the desired effect. (In the case of  the geostationary orbit, trans-
missions even from close to 36,000 km are supposed to be re-
ceived clearly on earth.5) This results in a fundamental twofold 
legal approach when it comes to the international legal frame-
work for IRQZs, which translates into two distinct geograph-
ical parts of  any individual IRQZ: national territory, including 
airspace, respectively the international areas of  outer space and 
(occasionally) the high seas.
4.1. National Territory and National Airspace
The area under consideration would find itself  for one part 
within the territory of  a particular state, or possibly involve 
the territory of  a small number of  states. This also applies in 
the case of  observatories on islands in the high seas. Finding 
one or a few states willing to implement the measures desired 
would suffice here.6
Basically, any particular state or group of  neighboring states 
would have complete freedom to establish legislation prohib-
iting or conditioning any relevant activity as far as desired, and 
thus, e.g. to establish radio quietness (or even silence) in a par-
ticular area. Both legal instruments and (if  necessary) rele-
vant precedents of  different sorts will be available, probably 
in abundance, to implement within the territory/ies concerned 
the required national measures. Individual states also have the 
comprehensive means to monitor, adjudicate and if  necessary 
sanction potentially interfering activities within the designat-
ed area. The size of  the required area, at least ‘horizontally’, 
presents no additional problems from this perspective; what 
counts is which state’s territory would be included in the zone 
to be designated.
5Note that, for practicability’s sake, international radio quiet zones 
should not be situated near the equator. The geostationary orbit finds 
itself  perpendicularly above the equator and contains satellites which 
by definition hardly move relative to earth. This means that such sat-
ellites would, to the extent already present, have to be largely quieted, 
completely silenced or even removed from that orbit, and to the ex-
tent planned, prohibited or redirected to other slots on or other or-
bits. In view of  the advantages of  using this orbit and its consequent 
popularity, it would neither be realistically feasible nor provide a jus-
tifiable balance between commercial and scientific interests, to estab-
lish IRQZs on or near the equator.
6Several areas have already been seriously discussed from this per-
spective, the essence being that such areas have no big cities and are 
generally rather thinly populated and travelled. This means that the 
‘sacrifice’ of  severely curtailing mobile satellite communication activi-
ties for the purpose of  radio astronomy would be relatively small.
vatory—as mentioned, in three dimensions!—to fall within 
the applicable limitations, at least to the extent that their ra-
dio emissions would interfere substantially with the activities 
concerned. Of  course, the likelihood of  international ramifi-
cations increases correspondingly for an IRQZ.
Fourth, in the case of  NRQZs, the US FCC has the final 
say as to whether a license will be granted—that is, wheth-
er appreciable interference will actually occur or not. Here, 
one touches upon the rather comprehensive scope of  appli-
cable enforcement competencies involved in NRQZs. Within 
the US, the FCC is a federal government body, operating un-
der federal laws and itself  endowed with comprehensive reg-
ulatory competencies. Licenses for radio communications ac-
tivities are used as the mechanism to protect radio astronomy; 
by not granting them or by subjecting them to applicable con-
ditions, substance is given to the protection of  radio astrono-
my in the relevant cases. These licenses do not just deal with 
particular frequencies to be used on an exclusive or preferen-
tial basis, they also incorporate the ‘spatial’ aspects of  the pro-
tection regime: the area where certain equipment is allowed to 
operate under relevant conditions and which is consequent-
ly to be monitored. Most importantly, any violation of  license 
obligations can be brought before US courts to be adjudicated 
and, if  necessary, enforced in that area.
It remains to be seen how these aspects of  NRQZs would 
translate to cases of  IRQZs, in view of  the international ram-
ifications, large complexity and measure of  detail of  arrange-
ments required for a full-fledged and effective IRQZ. Expedi-
tious handling of  all relevant requests for licenses or permis-
sions from communication operators in the IRQZ, respective-
ly for exceptions to the established maxima, would require a 
substantial and continuous effort in terms of  manpower and 
finances. Also, a mechanism should be provided which deter-
mines whether any established maximum has been exceeded. It 
should be the interference measured by such mechanism at the 
observatory in question which in the end determines the con-
stellation of  domes, yet at the same time it should be translat-
ed into output levels of  relevant equipment in order to provide 
for a workable determination of  that constellation through the 
virtual series of  superimposing domes. This translation again 
is a matter in the first place for stakeholders to achieve and ef-
fectuate. Precisely because an IRQZ would require such efforts 
on a much larger scale, in view of  the size and international 
ramifications, however, the international (institutional) situa-
tion in its current configuration would be much less conducive 
to accommodate these needs.
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heights of  at least a few hundred kilometers above the surface 
of  the earth.
This leaves basically two ways of  subjecting a particular mo-
bile communications satellite to relevant obligations, for ex-
ample, shutting down transmitters when overflying the IRQZ 
during certain periods. (It is taken to be self-evident that, con-
trary to aircraft, it will not be feasible even in principle to make 
individual satellites change course for the mere purpose of  
avoiding the upper part of  an IRQZ.)
The first option is that of  registration of  the satellite, which 
gives the state of  registration jurisdiction over it.11 However, 
obviously, this is a piecemeal and ad hoc measure, only appli-
cable, moreover, to a state’s ‘own’ satellites, i.e. satellites with 
respect to which the particular state(s) establishing the IRQZ 
qualify/ies as ‘launching state’.12 A state simply cannot assert 
jurisdiction over a satellite through registration of  it against the 
will of  the (other) states involved in the launch of  that partic-
ular satellite.
The other option consists of  international treaty instruments, 
i.e. regulation on the international plane by the community of  
states as a whole. Here, the ITU legal framework immediately 
comes to mind, based on a Constitution, a Convention and Ra-
dio Regulations which have the status of  treaty law.13 Relevant 
law has arisen within the ITU framework concerns, for exam-
ple the reservation, exclusively or on a priority basis, of  certain 
frequency bands for radio astronomy,14 and duties related to 
the avoidance of  harmful interference with (other) ITU-coor-
dinated communication activities (which include for this pur-
pose the activities of  merely receiving radio signals).15
Observatories which form the center of  an IRQZ may also 
be constructed on islands in the high seas. In such cases, while 
the islands themselves and their territorial waters form part of  
sovereign territory in a legal sense, parts of  the high seas—
qualifying as areas falling outside the territory of  any partic-
ular state—will also become involved. The advantages of  an
11See Art. VIII, Outer Space Treaty.
12See e.g. Art. II, Convention on Registration of  Objects Launched 
into Outer Space, New York, adopted November 12, 1974, opened 
for signature January 14, 1975, entered into force September 15, 1976; 
14 ILM 43 (1975); 28 UST 695; TIAS 8480; 1023 UNTS 15.
13Constitution and Convention of  the International Telecommuni-
cation Union (hereafter ITU Constitution respectively ITU Conven-
tion), Geneva, done December 22, 1992, entered into force July 1, 
1994; Final Acts of  the Additional Plenipotentiary Conference, Ge-
neva, 1992 (1993), at 1 and 71, respectively; Instrument amending the 
Constitution and Convention of  the International Telecommunica-
tion Union (Geneva, 1992), Kyoto, done October 14, 1994, entered 
into force January 1, 1996; Final Acts of  the Plenipotentiary Confer-
ence, Kyoto, 1994 (1995), at 1 and 23, respectively. The Plenipoten-
tiary Conference at Minneapolis in 1998 further amended these in-
struments.
14Cf. e.g. Artt. 6, 12–14, ITU Constitution; Artt. 7–10, ITU Conven-
tion.
15Cf. e.g. Artt. 6, 44, 45, ITU Constitution.
This includes, legally speaking, the airspace over that territo-
ry/those territories. States at the outset have full legal control 
over which aircraft enter their airspace, and under which con-
ditions. Among such conditions could rank, at least in princi-
ple, circumvention of  any part of  the national airspace which 
is included in an IRQZ.7 It should be pointed out that this 
might be the only feasible means of  providing for radio quiet-
ness to the desired extent, as for obvious safety reasons, it will 
be well-nigh impossible to curtail aircraft communications in 
the relevant area substantially enough to serve the purpose of  
the IRQZ. In as far as either applicable multilateral treaties8 or 
bilateral air services agreements provide for relevant obliga-
tions of  the state(s) in question towards other states and their 
airlines and aircraft as to airways and transit rights, this would 
not even be allowed without further ado, since such interna-
tional rights cannot be denied or abrogated unilaterally.
Here, the possibilities for ‘time-sharing’—between overflying 
aircraft and radio astronomy observatories on the ground—
might be further investigated. If, for example, the intervals be-
tween overflying aircraft leave enough time for such observa-
tories to make useful observations, such time-sharing is de fac-
to already realized at the outset, not even requiring for the time 
being any further regulatory measures.
4.2. International Outer Space and International High Seas
The major problem from an international legal perspective 
arises, where areas falling outside the legal control of  any par-
ticular state are involved. By definition, in all cases relevant to 
IRQZs, this applies to the satellites which come within geo-
graphically relevant ranges of  radio astronomy observatories 
on the ground, with the result of  possible interference, and the 
requirement arises legally to prevent, to condition a prior and/
or control a posteriori activities of  these satellites. Wherever any 
precise borderline between airspace and outer space may be 
considered to exist,9 it is beyond discussion that such satellites 
operate in outer space and, in consequence, are not subject to 
any (underlying) state’s sovereign territorial jurisdiction.10 The 
LEO- and MEO-systems referred to, for example, operate at
7Cf. also Art. 9, Convention on International Civil Aviation (hereafter 
Chicago Convention), Chicago, done December 7, 1944, entered into 
force April 4, 1947; 15 UNTS 296; TIAS 1591.
8Cf. e.g. Artt. 1, 5, 6, Chicago Convention.
9See for this discussion e.g. literature mentioned in the present au-
thor’s Private Enterprise and Public Interest in the European ‘Spaces-
cape’ (1998), 12, at no. 17. To the extent such claims are put forward, 
they tend to envisage such a borderline at roughly some 100 km ver-
tically above the earth.
10See Art. II, Outer Space Treaty.
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It could be envisaged by way of  a three-dimensional analogy 
with EEZs to establish IRQZs sufficiently large in dimension, 
giving ‘underlying’ states functional jurisdiction for the speci-
fied and limited purpose of  allowing certain radio astronomy 
observatories on their territory to operate without prohibitive 
interference. This would be in conformity with existing space 
law concepts and principles, and partly even in further elabo-
ration thereof, and would result in the imposition of  radio qui-
etness to the desired extent on any communication satellite en-
tering the IRQZ.
This could be labelled the ‘EEZ-approach’ to IRQZs: work-
ing towards an international agreement of  sufficient substance 
and legal binding force to allow certain states to exercise well-
defined and limited functional competencies in an IRQZ by 
way of  an extension of  their respective territorial sovereign-
ties.
5.2. Antarctica
Antarctica presents another interesting case, especially, since 
as of  1998 the continent has been declared a “natural reserve 
dedicated to peace and science.” Territorial claims, and indeed 
the possibility of  asserting territorial claims with regard to this 
continent, widely considered to be terra communis (i.e. not 
susceptible to becoming part of  any particular state’s territo-
ry), were frozen by means of  the Antarctic Treaty of  1959.18 
This treaty involved as contracting parties all states having 
shown substantial interest in the continent, and this fact was 
given even greater importance with the later accession of  other 
states once these had shown similar substantial interest.
As a consequence, the Antarctic Treaty has often been char-
acterised as an optimal example of  a ‘law-making treaty’. While 
normally a treaty can only bind those states party to it, a law-
making treaty would result in binding obligations at least as 
to its general contents also for those states not having ratified 
or even signed such a treaty. Antarctica is an area which per-
force requires an ‘all(-states)-or-nothing’ approach; any mean-
ingful preservation of  certain general interests necessitates 
adherence by all states to relevant rules and principles. Only 
those states having undertaken substantial activities with re-
gard to that continent, and having spent considerable efforts 
in terms of  manpower and funds, are justified in claiming they 
can identify such general interests and take the appropriate le-
gal measures. The burden of  proof  would rest squarely upon 
other states to show that such measures are not adequate or are
18Antarctic Treaty, Washington, done December 1, 1959, entered into 
force June 23, 1961; 402 UNTS 71. See esp. Art. IV.
IRQZ largely covering sea or ocean areas are obvious. The 
need to allow for some safety-and distress-related seaborne 
or airborne communications in that IRQZ would remain, but 
would in all probability cause considerably less frequent inter-
ference in practice than in territory-bound circumstances.
Still, on the high seas, similar to outer space, the tradition-
al freedoms of  the high seas apply for all states and may not 
be curtailed by any particular state at its discretion.16 Some of  
these freedoms evidently involve communications issues, mak-
ing it impossible for any single state to curtail such communi-
cations by means of  an IRQZ without further ado.
5. IRQZs: Potential Precedents under International Law
Interestingly, international law already offers a number of  
legal constructions, which may serve as interesting potential 
precedents for the establishment of  IRQZs.
5.1. The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
The concept of  the EEZ was established by means of  the 
1982 Convention on the Law of  the Sea,17 and concerns a zone 
with a maximum of  200 nautical miles of  breadth (horizontal-
ly), calculated from the low-tide coast line and to be express-
ly announced by the coast state. The part of  the EEZ clos-
est to the shore forms part of  the territorial waters of  the rel-
evant coast state anyway, and thus falls comprehensively un-
der its jurisdiction; it does not require consideration here. The 
maximum breadth of  the territorial waters allowed under the 
1982 Convention is 12 nautical miles; so at least 188 nautical 
miles of  an EEZ would fall outside coastal state territorial ju-
risdiction.
Abrogation of  the traditional freedoms of  the high seas—as 
mentioned, an area in legal terms largely comparable to that of  
outer space—in the EEZ constitutes the core element of  the 
EEZ regime. This is, by way of  exception to the rule, and only 
to the extent that the regime itself  explicitly allows for the ex-
ercise of  functional jurisdiction of  the coastal state to the ex-
clusion of  others, for limited purposesFnotably regarding eco-
nomic exploitation.
16These freedoms currently encompass the freedoms of  navigation, 
of  overflight, of  laying submarine cables and pipelines, of  construct-
ing artificial islands and other installations, of  fishing and of  scientif-
ic research, with a few caveats; see Art. 87(1), United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of  the Sea, Montego Bay, adopted April 30, 1982, 
opened for signature December 10, 1982, entered into force Novem-
ber 16, 1994; 21 ILM 1261 (1982).
17See in particular Part V, Artt. 55 ff., United Nations Convention on 
the Law of  the Sea.
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scientific purposes and under the direction of  scientists. Nu-
clear weapons are completely outlawed. For outer space, on 
the other hand, a dichotomy is realized: on the Moon and oth-
er celestial bodies exclusively peaceful activities are the only ac-
tivities admitted, whereas the void of  outer space itself  is only 
legally safeguarded against the stationing of  nuclear and oth-
er mass-destruction weapons—using space as a trajectory for 
nuclear weapons is not outlawed. As for the high seas, a rele-
vant treaty was concluded in 197120 denuclearizing the seabed, 
ocean floor and subsoil thereof.
Also within the other category of  denuclearized and/or de-
militarized territories, those falling under state sovereignty, a 
number of  different cases could be distinguished. East Ger-
many, only part of  the united Germany, is denuclearized to 
the extent of, and as a consequence of, the status of  Germa-
ny as such, and is only for a certain period not to be occupied 
by NATO forces, possibly carrying nuclear arms. This status 
is the consequence of  international treaty obligations involv-
ing, apart from Germany itself, the four victor states of  World 
War II.21 The Treaty of  Tlatelolco denuclearizes Latin Ameri-
ca as a continent,22 whereas the Treaty of  Rarotonga achieves 
the same for the South Pacific area.23 Both treaties, in addition 
to involving South American and Southern Pacific states, re-
spectively (try to), involve the nuclear powers as guarantors by 
means of  additional protocols. An effort to establish a nuclear-
free zone in Africa has not yet met with success.24
A final category concerns purely unilateral initiatives by par-
ticular states to denuclearize one’s own territory; this usual-
ly results in problems only within collective defence organi-
zations where other member states do not wish to disclose 
whether particular arms shipments include nuclear weapons 
or not. Examples are Denmark within NATO and Australia 
and New Zealand within ASEAN, notably vis-à-vis the US. 
Perhaps somewhat similar in nature are the unilateral neu-
trality declarations which have been enunciated e.g. by Swe-
den and Finland. In sum, in some cases, the establishment of
20Treaty on the Prohibition of  the Emplacement of  Nuclear Weap-
ons and Other Weapons of  Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the 
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof, London/Moscow/Washing-
ton, adopted December 7, 1970, opened for signature February 11, 
1971, entered into force May 18, 1972; 10 ILM 145 (1971).
21Cf. Artt. 3, 5, Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Ger-
many, Moscow, done September 12, 1990, entered into force March 
4, 1991; 29 ILM 1186 (1990).
22Treaty for the Prohibition of  Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 
Mexico City, done February 14, 1967, entered into force September 
20, 1967; 6 ILM 521 (1967).
23South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Rarotonga, done August 6, 
1985, entered into force December 11, 1986; 24 ILM 1440 (1985).
24An African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of  Pelinda-
ba) was established in 1996, but, far from having entered into force, 
has enjoyed only three ratifications so far.
unjustified, before they could claim that such measures would 
not have to be respected and adhered to by them.
The Madrid Protocol entering into force in 199819 was the 
culmination of  a series of  international initiatives progressive-
ly intending to preserve the environmentally pristine charac-
ter of  the continent. In this process, the balance between en-
vironmental and scientific concerns and prospective commer-
cial interests shifted considerably to the benefit of  the former. 
By declaring Antarctica a natural reserve for peace and science, 
the Protocol achieved a remarkable result: for a period of  (at 
least) 50 years any economic exploitation (whether state or pri-
vate) of  Antarctic mineral resources is now prohibited in the 
interests of  mankind, among those interests specifically being 
the advancement of  science.
The Outer Space Treaty shows a number of  characteristics 
rather similar to the Antarctic Treaty which may be of  inter-
est for the establishment of  IRQZs. Obvious parallels seem to 
offer themselves with the interests of  mankind as a whole in 
space science and investigation, and the desirability—in the ab-
stract—to allow for some space for such activities in those ar-
eas where commercial interests would be, relatively speaking, 
little harmed by being conditioned.
This could be labelled the ‘Antarctica-approach’ to IRQZs: 
establishing by means of  an international agreement of  suf-
ficient substance and legal binding force certain zones with-
in the terra communis of  outer space where all states are to re-
frain themselves, and restrain their entities, from undertaking 
any activities unduly interfering with the relevant radio astron-
omy activities.
5.3. Denuclearized and/or Demilitarized Zones
A more general case of  interest for the present issue con-
cerns the establishment of  denuclearized and/or demilitarized 
zones. The general idea behind it obviously is that mankind is 
better off, i.e. runs fewer risks of  nuclear or military escala-
tion, if  certain areas of  the world remain free from nuclear or 
all weaponry—not just free from its use or its being tested, but 
free from its presence altogether.
Antarctica, outer space and the high seas, areas falling out-
side any state’s jurisdiction (albeit in the first case not unequiv-
ocally so), are all denuclearized or demilitarized. However, the 
measure of  denuclearization and demilitarisation realized dif-
fers substantially. Antarctica is completely demilitarized in the 
sense that military operations of  any kind are prohibited, and 
military personnel are only allowed as long as operating for
19Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Ma-
drid, done October 4, 1991, entered into force January 14, 1998; 30 
ILM 1455 (1991).
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the fundamental parameters for the Radio Regulations and 
other ITU regulations.
While hitherto the ITU system may have served well, as gen-
erally undisputed and accepted by all states, this might no lon-
ger be the case. With the advent of  thoroughly commercial ap-
plications, many private entities have entered this field who are 
more ‘aggressive’ in their market behavior, not always aware 
of—let alone sympathetic to—non-commercial public inter-
ests, and at any rate one step removed from the legal regime 
established within the ITU, still fundamentally an intergov-
ernmental organization. Partly as a consequence, in addition, 
some of  the states concerned have shown a tendency to disre-
gard the slow, cumbersome and often inefficient and/or errat-
ic processes taking place within the ITU.
Nevertheless, there is no inherent reason why this situation 
should not change. This ‘ICAO-approach’ to IRQZs—having 
an international organization endowed, by means of  an inter-
national agreement of  sufficient substance and legal binding 
force, with (quasi-)jurisdictional competencies for the terra com-
munis-part of  the IRQZ—might point to either establishing 
similar powers for ITU, or establishing them for another in-
ternational organization—existing or to be established. A sim-
ilar approach might, moreover, result from closer analysis of  
the role which the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
plays with respect to maritime activities on the high seas.
6. Conclusions: Towards IRQZs under International Law?
If  IRQZs are indeed to be established, following from the 
foregoing analysis, three different fields actually offer them-
selves for legal action: the national areas, the aspect of  or-
bits and frequencies for the international areas, and the in-
ternational areas of  outer space and the high seas as such.
6.1. The National Areas
A few individual states would have to be convinced of  the de-
sirability and practicability of  IRQZs, in order to take all the 
national legislative measures required. An IRQZ incorporating 
territory of  more than one state obviously requires such mea-
sures from all of  the states concerned.
Such measures would result in a three-dimensional area of  
sufficient size to be subjected to maximum levels of  interfer-
ence with the observatory as the center of  a series of  super-
imposing domes. These measures should then basically lead to 
the results that: (1) no sending stations should be allowed to 
operate in that area if  exceeding the applicable imposed maxi-
ma, as subject further to time-sharing or frequency-sharing ar-
rangements and (2) no aircraft should be allowed to enter the 
IRQZ, since, even if  their entry as such would not already be 
prohibitive for radio astronomy activities, for reasons of  safety
denuclearized and/or demilitarized zones is similar to the es-
sentials of  the ‘Antarctica-approach’; other cases, however, are 
of  a completely different nature. Thus, the relevant legal con-
structions have been effectuated in a number of  different legal 
ways, and this makes it difficult to distinguish any clear guid-
ance from the precedents concerned, other than that of  in-
volving ‘third’ states as ‘guarantors’ of  non-interference with a 
localised regime—i.e. an IRQZ once established.
5.4. The Rule-Making Powers of  ICAO over the High Seas
Finally, a specific legal construction of  interest concerns the 
rule-making powers which the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization (ICAO) exercises over the high seas for aviation 
purposes.25 Comparable perhaps to some extent to function-
al jurisdiction, only this time not of  a state but of  an interna-
tional intergovernmental organization, for the overriding inter-
est of  mankind in safe and efficient international air transpor-
tation activities it has been possible to subject the traditional 
freedom of  overflight over the high seas to a system of  bind-
ing (traffic) rules. Included in this regime are certain aspects of  
aeronautical communications.26
The analogy with the ITU, exercising for somewhat similar 
purposes competence vis-à-vis one particular but prominent 
use of  outer space, as an area legally similar to the high seas, 
suggests itself. Indeed, the ITU deals with the two physical ‘as-
sets’ which are indispensable for satellite communications: or-
bits and frequencies. The ITU coordinates the use of  orbital 
slots, as far as the geostationary orbit is concerned, and of  the 
orbits themselves in the cases of  other orbits. It also coordi-
nates the frequencies to be used with respect to the satellite oc-
cupying a certain slot or orbit, the so-called up-link and down-
link frequencies. For these reasons, it would evidently be use-
ful, practical and even unavoidable to involve the ITU-mech-
anism in any effort to establish a regime calling for limits to, 
conditions on, or the altogether ceasing of  satellite transmis-
sion activities over a certain area.
However, it should be realized that the ITU does not possess 
competence comparable to that of  ICAO. It would be high-
ly doubtful whether ITU can determine, independently from 
individual member states, binding legal rights and obligations 
of  a sufficiently far-reaching and substantial nature, let alone 
enforce regulations vis-à-vis specific states and their private 
entities. Such competence would seem rather to rest with the 
collectivity of  member states operating through World Radio 
Conferences (WRCs) and similar mechanisms which control
25Cf. Artt. 12, 37(c), 44(a), (d) and (h), 54(l), 90, Chicago Convention; 
in conjunction with Annex 2 to the Convention.
26See also Annex 10 to the Chicago Convention.
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be realized furthermore that the ITU, as an organization es-
tablished for functional reasons and along functionalist lines, 
has dealt with the coordination and allotment of  frequency 
bands—i.e. reserving certain frequency bands for certain ser-
vices—rather than reserving certain geographical areas for 
certain services irrespective of  which frequencies are used.28 
Thus, its authority and main field of  activity are almost or-
thogonal to the essential parameters involved in establishing an 
IRQZ. In consequence, for example, the ITU has no authority 
to license or preclude operations for a certain area, as the FCC 
has; it does not even have the authority to condition licensing 
by national authorities apart from the de facto and rather indi-
rect implementation of  WRC decisions and Radio Regulations 
on frequency aspects.
The relevance of  the ITU-framework for arranging any 
IRQZ has thus been determined, and the proper place of  any 
‘ITU approach’—availing oneself  of  the ITU framework to 
realize the establishment of  IRQZs—in this respect outlined. 
Since the fundamental characteristics of  any IRQZ present so 
many features new to ITU procedures and regulation (compre-
hensiveness, size, measure of  detail of  arrangements required, 
need for monitoring equipment and procedures, sanction is-
sues, requirement of  an ‘all-or-nothing-approach’), a quantum-
leap is required for which the ITU-structure might not be suf-
ficiently equipped without fundamental changes.
6.3. The International Areas—Outer Space and High Seas
The similarity of  the concept of  the IRQZ especially to such 
concepts as the EEZ, the natural reserve for peace and sci-
ence which is Antarctica, and the international regulatory pow-
ers given to the ICAO under the Chicago Convention with re-
spect to the airspace over the high seas, has been noted. Fol-
lowing also from the restricted possibilities offered by the ‘ITU 
approach’, such similarities point in the following direction.
For the international areas involved--outer space and possi-
bly the high seas—one way or another an international licens-
ing-relevant structure should be realized. Whilst licensing as 
such remains an essentially national activity, IRQZs would re-
quire a fundamental legal authority on an international scale, to 
control the use of  transmitters in those areas and thus to sub-
ject it to relevant conditions and this in a manner fundamental-
ly similar to licensing as it is currently undertaken, for example, 
by the FCC for the US—only partially in implementation of
28Only at a secondary level, geographical limitations are being pro-
vided for, in the sense that certain allotments may be made for cer-
tain areas. Usually, however, these areas concern one or two conti-
nents comprehensively, rather than individual states—let alone only 
parts thereof.
aircraft could never be obliged to shut down communications 
channels. Obviously, any choice over ‘time-sharing’ or ‘fre-
quency-sharing’ would considerably mitigate the consequenc-
es for communication satellite operators as well as aircraft and 
their respective operators, and would therefore present a much 
more feasible and acceptable option.
In addition, the applicable national legal system will have to 
ascertain legal force for any such measures, subject to the ad-
judicative authority of  its court system, and establish the nec-
essary executive powers to monitor and enforce adherence to 
the obligations and duly punish offenders.
In the ‘national area’, thus, national action by individual states 
is called for, ultimately resulting in implementation of  the 
IRQZ with respect to its territory and airspace. On the inter-
national level, actions in this regard will consequently remain 
confined to efforts to interest relevant states, and to try to add 
on to any national efforts towards establishment of  an IRQZ 
such international legal actions are necessary in the two oth-
er areas.
6.2. The International Areas—Orbits and Frequencies
No territorial sovereignty of  individual states applies to the 
satellites which, in passing through the upper portions of  an 
IRQZ, are to be forced to cease or minimize transmissions for 
the duration of  such transit, or at least for certain periods or 
on certain frequencies. At first glance, the ITU may seem to be 
best poised to deal with this international part of  a radio qui-
et zone.
Decisions taken at the WRCs combined with the Radio Reg-
ulations result in a very elaborate regime distributing rights to 
use certain frequencies and/or orbits (or orbital slots in the 
case of  the geostationary orbit), often under conditions and 
with important refinements or exceptions by way of  the so-
called ‘footnotes’. These Radio Regulations and the relat-
ed WRC decisions basically have the same status as the ITU 
Constitution and ITU Convention, and are therefore indeed 
of  a binding-treaty nature.27 Whether through Convention or 
WRCs and Radio Regulations, or a combination of  both, al-
lowance should be made for particular IRQZs in terms of  
frequency- and orbit-allotments, to be further implemented 
through national assignment procedures. Obviously, here an 
‘ITU-approach’ would be essential.
Nevertheless, the ITU has no independent authority, where 
such independent authority would be the best guarantee against 
non-transparent and incoherent IRQZ-related policies. It must
27Cf. e.g. Artt. 4(2) and (3), 54(1), ITU Constitution.
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agreement of  a sufficiently substantive nature may be hard to 
come by or even impossible, and other issues might cloud the 
discussions. Also, the timeframes for more or less globally ac-
cepted treaties are notoriously long.
Lesser mechanisms than treaties, which nevertheless would 
not be without legal effect and might in the end themselves 
lead to a treaty or protocol being established, involve the pos-
sibility of  establishing United Nations Resolutions, prefera-
bly by consensus, or even unilateral declarations by individu-
al states announcing establishment of  a particular IRQZ and 
expressing the intention—at least politically—to aim for inter-
national respect thereof  by other relevant states and their pri-
vate entities.
It may be interesting to bear in mind that the legal concept 
of  the continental shelf, which was rapidly accepted by many 
other states and later codified in conventions on the law of  the 
sea, started its existence as a legal concept by means of  a uni-
lateral declaration of  the US in 1948. Also, in a somewhat sim-
ilar vein, it may be recalled that the Antarctic Treaty, originally 
established by a mere 12 states and often blasted for its semi-
exclusive claims to establish the legal regime for that area and 
impose it erga omnes, now enjoys a partisanship of  more than 
40 states, and de facto—though sometimes grudging—respect 
from most other states in addition.
In the end, various roads might lead to Rome for the purpose 
of  effectuating IRQZs. Which legal mechanism will be cho-
sen therefore is ultimately a policy and/or political issueFas 
much as depending upon certain technical-scientific require-
ments and feasibilities, most notably those relating to distanc-
es from observatories and acceptable power levels. One thing 
is clear though: if  mankind wants to continue to be able to lis-
ten to celestial symphonies, legal action will have to be taken 
in the near future.
ITU regulations!—and backed up with the required legal adju-
dication and enforcement competence.
Ideally, a treaty should be established which recognizes the 
principle of  IRQZs. Such a treaty should then either give the 
individual states concerned functional jurisdiction in that zone, 
even for the part of  it which extends to outer space (the ‘EEZ-
approach’), or give the states party to it competence to joint-
ly impose radio quietness in the outer space-part of  an IRQZ 
(the ‘Antarctica-approach’), or provide an organization (already 
existing or to be established by the treaty) with the compe-
tence to impose radio quietness there (the ‘ICAO-approach’), 
or possibly any combination of  the foregoing.
Notably, it should direct the implementation at the nation-
al level of  licensing regimes required for the purpose. From 
the current perspective, inclusion of  those states international-
ly responsible and/or internationally liable for private satellite 
communications operators29 in the treaty-regime to be estab-
lished would be essential. These states are directly and compre-
hensively involved in the licensing of  such operations and the 
conditioning of  their operations, and can thus give effect to 
their international accountabilities at the domestic level.
Such a treaty, or an organization given the necessary func-
tions by it, should also direct, or liaise with ITU to implement 
measures through the latter’s regulatory mechanisms directly 
relating to the use of  any frequencies and orbits for satellites 
whenever and wherever these are transiting radio quiet zones. 
Similar directions or liaising activities should be provided for in 
respect of  ICAO and IMO in regard to issues of  airborne and 
seaborne communications.
While a treaty—or a protocol to the Outer Space Treaty—
ratified by all relevant states from the perspective of  satellite 
communications would represent the legal optimum, there are 
obvious (political) risks inherent in such an approach. General 
29Cf. esp. Artt. VI, VII, Outer Space Treaty.
